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Introduction 
This volume constitutes an attempt to bring together philosophies of 
time—or more precisely philosophies on time and, in a concomitant way, 
history—emerging from Christianity’s and Islam’s intellectual history. 
Starting from the Neoplatonic heritage and the voice of classical philoso-
phy, we will enter the Byzantine and Arabic intellectual worlds up to Ibn 
Al-Arabi’s times. A conscious choice in this volume is not to engage with, 
perhaps, the most prominent figures of Christian and Arabic philosophy, 
i.e., Augustine on the one hand (whose views of time are so often quoted) 
and Avicenna/Ibn Sina on the other, precisely because these have attracted 
so much attention due to their prominence in their respective traditions—
and beyond. Such a treatment would eclipse the variety of voices repre-
sented here. In a certain way, Maximus the Confessor and Ibn Al-Arabi 
emerge in this volume as alternative representatives of their two traditions, 
offering two axes for our endeavor. 
The book begins with Sergey Trostyanskiy; his chapter “Iamblichus’ 
Response to Aristotle’s and Pseudo-Archytas’ Theory of Time” offers, as 
already noted, a view of certain aspects of the common Neoplatonic—and 
thus, in an indirect way, classical and Aristotelian—legacy that forms a 
basis for the philosophical “language” of both traditions. We then move to 
the Byzantine Christian side of this book’s inquiry with Smilen Markov’s 
“The Byzantine Concept of Historical Time: Origin and Development.” 
According to Markov, the formation of the Byzantine concept of historical 
time took place through the reception and transformation of Platonic, 
Aristotelian and Stoic concepts of time. The Byzantine model differs from 
the ancient and classical ones not merely due to its structure, but most of 
all due to its epistemological prerequisites and premises, for it relies on 
the anthropological dimensions of the experience of temporality, and not 
on the intellectual transcending of the flux of time. This is followed by 
Sotiris Mitralexis’ “Maximus the Confessor’s Theory of Time: A Christian-
isation of the Aristotelian Legacy?”; Maximus implicitly bases himself on a 
mediated Aristotelian legacy and arrives at a threefold theory of temporal-
ity, distinguishing between time (χρόνος), the Aeon (αἰών), which is to be 
distinguished from the notion of eternity as this is usually understood, and 
a distinct third mode of temporality, for which we will use Maximus’ of-
ii  Introduction  
ten-cited concept of the ever-moving repose (στάσις ἀεικίνητος). The 
Confessor uses a number of elements from the thought of his predecessors 
and contemporaries as stepping-stones in order to arrive at his unique 
synthesis, with Plato, Aristotle and Gregory of Nyssa being some of them—
the crucial differentiating element, however, being that Maximus’ under-
standing of time is dependent upon his ideas on deification and eschatolo-
gy. After this treatment of Maximus’ theory of time, the Maximian Byzan-
tine focus is concluded with Dionysios Skliris’ “Syn-odical Ontology: 
Maximus the Confessor’s Proposition for Ontology within History and in 
the Eschaton,” focusing on time as history. Skliris claims that the point of 
Maximus’ departure is an apophatic theology, in which God (in-Himself) is 
beyond not only essence but also being in general. The other side of this 
apophatic theology is a cosmology in which created being is presented as 
lacking ontology, since it is perpetually threatened by non-being. Conse-
quently, in the Maximian Christian perspective, the locus of ontology is 
Christology, because Christ unites God who is beyond being with created 
existence which is not “yet” being. This Christological ontology cannot but 
be eschatological in character, since it is in the eschaton that created exist-
ence, which is not “yet” being, finally acquires an ontological character 
through the full manifestation of the consequences of the hypostatical 
union. 
We enter the domain of the Islamic perspective with Mohamed Basil 
Altaie’s introductory chapter entitled “Time in Islamic Kalām.” Altaie 
examines the ideas of two leading Islamic thinkers about time, Ibn Ḥazm 
Al-Ẓāhirī and Al-Ghazālī. Both thinkers, who may be considered good 
representatives of kalām, refuted the notion of absolute space and absolute 
time, always considering space and time to be interrelated. Al-Ghazālī 
talked specifically about the “time-dimension” and considered it to be on 
equal footing with the spatial dimensions. In fact, many of the properties 
of time in Islamic kalām agree conceptually with the description of time in 
relativity theory. Furthermore, Islamic kalām assumes that time (like 
space) came into being with the creation of the universe, and therefore 
they consider the question on “what was God doing before the creation of 
the universe?” meaningless. Most of the mutakallimūn considered time 
(and space) to be distinct, being composed of finite, non-divisible mo-
ments called anah. Altaie proceeds to compare these insights with modern 
physics’ understanding of time and space. Once again moving from a 
treatment of time to a treatment of history, in Chapter Six Georgios Steiris 
expounds the teachings of “Al-Fārābi on the Role of Philosophy of History 
in the History of Civilization”—and, together with that, on the relationship 
and at times tension between philosophy and theology in Al-Fārābi’s 
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thought. The volume concludes with Mohamed Ali Haj Yousef’s “Zeno’s 
Paradoxes and the Reality of Motion According to Ibn al-Arabi’s Single 
Monad Model of the Cosmos.” According to this close look into Ibn al-
Arabi’s work, the Re-creation Principle is one of the main notions of Ibn al-
Arabi’s Single Monad Model of Creation which postulates that the cosmos is 
perpetually being re-created by the Single Monad that continuously and 
successively scans all possible states of creation to complete a comprehen-
sive instance of space, just to start over a new instance to produce the flow 
of time and all associated phenomena of motion and change. Accordingly, 
there is no actual infinitesimal motion, or transmutation; rather than that, 
the observed objects are always at rest in the different positions that they 
appear in. This new concept of motion is used to explain Zeno’s paradoxes 
of motion and plurality, and can lead to interesting implications if brought 
in conversation with modern physics, something which forms part of the 
author’s project and intentions. 
The synthesis of those approaches on time and history, their comparison 
rather than their mere co-existence in the same book, is left to the reader, 
i.e., the reader’s critical inquiry and philosophical investigation. This is but 
the first step of a comparative project that awaits its realization; and the 
first step consists in the very formulation of the possibility of juxtaposing 
Christian and Islamic philosophies on time directly 
This forms part of a project under TÜBITAK’s Research Fellowship Pro-
gramme for International Researchers (2216) at the City University of 
Istanbul, Istanbul Şehir University: I herewith express my gratitude to TÜ-
BITAK and to City University of Istanbul for making this collaboration 
possible. 
Sotiris Mitralexis 
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 Chapter 1  
Iamblichus’ Response to Aristotle’s and 
Pseudo-Archytas’ 
Theories of Time 
Sergey Trostyanskiy 
1. Preamble 
Time has proved to be an enigmatic subject for scholars. Its nature, mode 
of existence, and so on, is by no means easily discernible. In the fourth 
century BC, Aristotle, in his various treatises on nature and logic, took 
great pains to spell out the issues pertaining to time, with the aim of fur-
nishing philosophically plausible solutions to the various challenges it 
posed. His account, along with his entire discourse on nature, went on to 
become amongst the most influential in the history of philosophy and 
science. Ever since, this subtle and persuasive theory of time has contin-
ued to fascinate, and at times perplex, scholars. During the late Ro-
man / Byzantine Empire (250–1453 CE), Aristotle’s physics had become 
part of the standard philosophy curriculum in both the Athenian and the 
Alexandrian academies. Voluminous commentaries on Aristotle were 
produced at that time, carefully commenting on and elucidating the mean-
ing of each and every detail of his treatises. In the third century CE, the 
“Divine” Iamblichus wrote his own scholia on Aristotle’s Physics (and Cate-
gories), aiming to expound the intricacies of the subject of time. In his 
work he followed the tradition of the commentators from his own Neopla-
tonic School, in particular Plotinus and Porphyry, as well as the Neopy-
thagorean school represented by Pseudo-Archytas, synthesizing in this 
way various distinct exegetical threads. His “intellectual interpretation” of 
Aristotle’s philosophical themes sought to disclose the deeper metaphysi-
cal significance of each topic under consideration. In the course of this, 
and while attempting to resolve the aporiai generated by Aristotle’s con-
ception of time, Iamblichus produced an account that paved the way for 
subsequent generations of Neoplatonic thinkers, including Proclus and 
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Damascius, where philosophical endeavors were concerned. Iamblichus’ 
response to Aristotle’s and Pseudo-Archytas’ theories of time will form the 
subject of this article. 
Aristotle had structured his own theory of time around the paradoxes of 
time discussed in the antecedently existing philosophical literature. Ap-
parently, though, he was not able to fully resolve those paradoxes. The 
main temporal aporiai that have kept on puzzling philosophers ever since 
are those that cluster around the twin paradoxes of the non-existence of 
time and the constantly changing instant. At the same time, the many and 
varied attempts to resolve them have produced what is by now a quite 
well-defined field of studies. Where the present topic is concerned, these 
paradoxes, together with the questions they entail, have preoccupied the 
tradition of commentators and modern scholars. Such questions may be 
set out as follows: What is the nature of time? Do motion and time entail 
one another? Is there some kind of timeless motion? Is there a form of 
motionless but time-bound process? What, ultimately, is motion? Can 
procession and reversion on the part of self-constituted beings be classi-
fied as motion? What are the status and scope of applicability of the cate-
gory “when?” And finally: does time itself move? 
Issues relating to time also perhaps lay at the very core of the agenda of 
Neopythagorean philosophy. The enigmatic philosopher Pseudo-Archytas 
in some sense may be said to have paved the way for the exegetical direc-
tions explored by Iamblichus with respect to the topic. The idea of con-
flicting characteristics that define the subject of time, already explicit in 
Aristotle, was brought to the forefront of philosophical investigations by 
this somewhat mysterious thinker, and seems to have greatly stimulated 
the development of Iamblichus’ own conception. 
2. Preparing the Ground: Iamblichus and the Issue 
of Time 
As Shmuel Sambursky and Salomon Pines rightly note, in the eyes of the 
Neoplatonists generally and Iamblichus in particular, 
[t]he intelligible world has still something of the statics characterizing 
the One, but it already contains the multiplicity of ideas. The intellectual 
world is characterized by an ambivalent state, which is partly static and 
partly dynamic.1  
                                                        
1Shmuel Sambursky and Salomon Pines, The Concept of Time in Late Neoplatonism: 
Texts with Translation, Introduction, and Notes (Jerusalem: Israel Academy of Sciences 
and Humanities, Section of Humanities, 1971), 13. 
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Sambursky, following Arthur H. Armstrong,2 suggests that since the in-
telligible world, in the eyes of the Neoplatonists, exhibited differentiation, 
and since a certain dynamism characterized the “behaviour” of its hypos-
tases, issues of time, eternity, perpetuity, etc., had of necessity come to the 
forefront of philosophical and theological developments over the course 
of the philosophical discussions of late antiquity. A debate over whether it 
was possible to philosophize—or rather engage in theological reflection—
about intellectual beings conceived as partaking of motion (and rest) 
certainly took place in Neoplatonist circles. Indeed, the Neoplatonist con-
ceptions of procession and reversion presented the intellectual realm as 
experiencing some sort of dynamism. However, it was by no means clear 
what this might entail. The precise connection between these ideas and 
that of motion was left unspecified, and what complicated the situation, 
moreover, was that the notions capable of expressing the dynamic charac-
ter of the intellectual realm (e.g., procession and reversion) had not fea-
tured in Aristotle’s treatises. In addition, they did not correspond to the 
types of motion found in the standard Aristotelian classification of motion. 
What, then, is motion (κίνησις)? How does it relate to becoming or 
“coming-to-be” (γένεσις)? According to Aristotle, becoming concerns in 
the first instance change of place (i.e., locomotion), and only then qualita-
tive and quantitative changes (alteration, increase and diminution). In the 
Physics, at certain points, he classifies these types of coming-to-be as spe-
cies of motion—albeit that becoming is here predicated of the subject with 
qualifications, since the subject that moves preserves its essential form 
while replacing certain non-essential characteristics. The subject thus 
comes-to-be “such and such.” For instance, it comes-to-be tired, altering a 
characteristic that previously defined its state (i.e., that of being rested). A 
formal change, on the other hand, that is coming-to-be without qualifica-
tion, and an unqualified passing-away, is just another type of change 
wherein the subject undergoes essential transformation. As a result, a new 
form is introduced. Aristotle classified this type of change as mutation 
(μεταβολή).3 However, in the context of his discourse on time he used the 
two terms (i.e., “κίνησις” and “μεταβολή”) interchangeably.4 
                                                        
2Arthur H. Armstrong, “Eternity, Life, and Movement in Plotinus’ Accounts of 
Nous,” in Le néoplatonisme: [Actes du Colloque de] Royaumont, 9–13 Juin 1969, Colloques 
Internationaux du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Sciences Humaines 
(Paris: Éditions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1971). 
3To sum up: “Ὅταν μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν ᾖ ἡ μεταβολὴ τῆς ἐναντιώσεως, αὔξη καὶ 
φθίσις, ὅταν δὲ κατὰ τόπον, φορά, ὅταν δὲ κατὰ πάθος καὶ τὸ ποιόν, ἀλλοίωσις, ὅταν 
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What is time? Aristotle, attempting to make sense of time, defined it as 
“the number of motion” in respect of before and after.5 This definition tied 
time to motion by classifying it as a property of motion. According to 
Aristotle, time does not exist on its own right but is one of the characteris-
tics of motion, and being in time—of moving things. Time places limits in 
respect of existence on things that come to be, change, and pass away.6 It 
measures the extent of their motion and determines the order of motion 
(their relation to one another as prior or posterior, or “before and after”). 
Aristotle further nuanced his argument by specifying the kind of num-
ber he had in mind. He tells us that this number (pertaining to motion) is 
not one but “the many,” its most basic unit being two, similar to the two 
extreme points that mark off a line.7 This reiteration now presents that 
which is countable in moving things as responsible for establishing the 
limits of motion. Hence, number here is the limit of motion, or rather, of 
some particular duration of the moving thing. He notes, however, that 
setting out the limit does not indicate an actual division of the continuum 
of our sublunar realm—one that is in a state of motion. By indicating dura-
tion, we intellectually delimit (or potentially divide)8 the continuum in 
order to delineate the starting point and end point of motion: a state 
where a new motion begins and a state where it comes to rest, arriving at 
immobility. The two “nows” initiate and terminate our counting. Whatev-
er lies in between is number as it pertains to that motion. Hence the latter 
is a “concrete” and composite number—one that fixes the limits of motion 
relating to the moving thing.   
                                                                                                          
δὲ μηδὲν ὑπομένῃ οὗ θάτερον πάθος ἢ συμβεβηκὸς ὅλως, γένεσις, τὸ δὲ φθορά.” 
Aristotle, Gen. corr. 319b31–320a2. Text following the edition Aristotle, On Generation 
and Corruption, ed. and transl. Charles Mugler, in De la génération et de la corruption, 
Collection des universités de France, Série grecque 444 (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 
1966). 
4Thus, “μηδὲν δὲ διαφερέτω λέγειν ἡμῖν ἐν τῷ παρόντι κίνησιν ἢ μεταβολήν.” Aris-
totle, Phys. 218b19. All passages quoted from the Physics follow the edition Aristotle, 
Physics, ed. William D. Ross, in Aristotelis Physica, corrected edition, Scriptorum 
classicorum bibliotheca Oxoniensis (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966). 
5
 “ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν ὁ χρόνος ἀριθμός ἐστιν κινήσεως κατὰ τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον.” 
Ibid., 220a24–5. 
6
Aristotle, Cael. 281a28–31, cf. Phys. 221b30–31. 
7
“ἐλάχιστος γὰρ κατὰ μὲν ἀριθμόν ἐστιν ὁ εἷς ἢ οἱ δύο, κατὰ μέγεθος δ’ οὐκ ἔστιν.” 
Aristotle, Phys. 220a31–2. 
8
Ibid., 222a10–21. 
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Number as it pertains to motion is a continuous quantity, and whatever 
is continuous should, by virtue of this, be infinitely divisible. However, we 
learn from Aristotle that one aspect of time, namely the “now,” is an ex-
tensionless instant—one that, as such, is discrete and indivisible. This 
extensionless instant divides the present from the past. Aristotle tells us, 
in the first place, that an instant is not a composite number. Rather, it is an 
abstract number, the numerical monad (“οἷον μονὰς ἀριθμοῦ”).9 Hence, its 
nature and the nature of the “proper” parts of time are heterogeneous, 
and as such, the “now,” according to Aristotle, cannot be a part of time. 
Again, he holds that the parts are the measure of the whole and insists 
that they should be homogeneous. Nevertheless, if looked at from a differ-
ent perspective, the “now” is an element of time of some sort. In that case, 
then, time is apparently both divisible and indivisible. This paradox tells 
us something about a key aspect of Aristotle’s theory of time: “Time, like a 
line, is continuous and the now, like a point, is indivisible.”10 The “now” is 
a potential divider and actual unifier of time, an extensionless instant that, 
nevertheless, secures the continuity of a temporal series. This dual impact 
of the “now” both divides and unites the continuum framing such a series 
within the schema of what precedes and what follows. The now is always 
the same and ever different. 
In general, according to Aristotle, becoming entails motion and muta-
tion, while motion (or change) is something measurable, and is ordered 
according to the schema “before and after.” Time measures the duration 
of existence of sensible particulars. And the category of “when” assigns 
temporal predicates to moving subjects. 
It should be noted in this context that Aristotle’s categorial schema has 
been an enduring subject of contention among commentators. Its critical 
reassessment, for the most part, was commenced in the third century by 
Plotinus, who launched a massive attack on it, endeavoring to reassess 
Aristotle’s accounts so as to properly delineate the sphere of application of 
the categories. He rejected Aristotle’s categorial schema, arguing that it 
lacks coherence because homonymy creeps into the discourse and makes 
the application of the schema unviable. Iamblichus, taking Plotinus’ cri-
tique of these categories along with Porphyry’s attempted defense as his 
starting point, elevated the process of critical appropriation of Aristotle’s 
schema to its highest level so far. A significant innovation was his “intel-
                                                        
9
Ibid., 220a4. 
10
Ursula C. M. Coope, Time for Aristotle: Physics IV. 10–14, Oxford Aristotle Studies 2 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005), 18. 
  
 
 
 
PAGES MISSING 
 FROM THIS FREE SAMPLE 
 Index
A 
Al-Arabi, i, iii, v, 145, 153, 154, 
155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 
162, 163, 165, 166, 167, 169, 
171, 172, 173, 174 
Al-Fārābi, ii, 135, 136, 137, 138, 
139, 140, 141, 142 
Al-Ghazālī, ii, 121, 122, 123, 125, 
127, 128, 129, 130, 131 
al-Rāzī, 135, 137 
alterity, 91 
Antiquity, 28, 48, 53, 89 
Archytas, 1 
Aristotle, i, 1, 30, 31, 34, 43, 48, 
50, 51, 52, 53, 57, 58, 60, 63, 
64, 65, 85, 91, 103, 104, 135, 
137, 139, 141, 142, 147, 148, 
149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 157, 
166 
B 
Basil of Caesarea, ii, v, 33, 34, 35, 
36, 37, 43, 50, 95, 119 
Byzantine, i, v, 27, 28, 29, 31, 33, 
36, 40, 43, 44, 99, 107, 138 
Byzantium, 27, 37, 43, 138 
C 
change, iii, 30, 32, 33, 34, 35, 40, 
41, 42, 50, 52, 54, 59, 67, 69, 
73, 74, 145, 150, 154, 166, 167, 
168, 171 
Christology, ii, 94, 100, 107, 108, 
111 
E 
Einstein, Albert, 29, 119, 167, 
168, 169, 170 
eschaton, ii, 99, 102, 105, 106, 
108, 112, 113 
eternity, i, 28, 30, 31, 32, 35, 36, 
37, 38, 39, 41, 42, 43, 47, 48, 
64, 65, 66, 92, 119, 164, 168 
G 
Gregory of Nyssa, ii, 34, 48, 49, 
58, 59 
H 
Heisenberg, Werner, 169 
Hesiod, 136 
hypostatic, 42, 43, 95, 98, 99, 101, 
106, 108, 109 
I 
Iamblichus, i, 1 
Ibn Ḥazm, ii, 121, 125, 126, 127, 
128, 129, 130 
178   Index 
 
intellectual, i, 27, 28, 29, 44, 101, 
162, 172, 173 
K 
kalām, ii, 119, 121, 122, 124, 125, 
126, 131 
Kalām, ii, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 
124, 126 
L 
Late Antiquity, 89 
logoi, 93, 95, 97, 101, 104 
M 
Maximus the Confessor, i, ii, 33, 
36, 38, 39, 40, 41, 47, 48, 49, 
53, 54, 56, 58, 59, 60, 61, 63, 
64, 66, 67, 69, 71, 72, 73, 75, 
76, 78, 85, 86, 94, 97, 98, 104, 
107 
motion, iii, 34, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 
53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 
61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 
69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 
77, 78, 79, 103, 108, 119, 124, 
125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 
145, 146, 148, 149, 150, 151, 
153, 158, 165, 167, 168, 169, 
170 
motionless, 54, 55, 65, 71, 74, 125 
Mutakallimūn, 120, 121, 123, 
125, 126, 127, 128, 129 
N 
Neoplatonism, 28, 29, 31, 34, 48, 
87, 89, 93, 97, 135, 154, 156 
Neoplatonic, i, 28, 29, 30, 39, 
56, 86, 137, 138 
O 
ontological, ii, 28, 30, 31, 32, 35, 
36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 42, 55, 58, 
61, 62, 64, 66, 70, 78, 85, 87, 
89, 92, 97, 100, 106, 107, 109, 
110, 111, 112, 151, 154, 160, 
173 
Origen, 28, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 37, 
38, 43 
P 
Parmenides, 28, 145, 146, 147, 
148, 154, 157, 160, 167, 169, 
170 
participation, 36, 39, 56, 71, 72, 
76, 90, 102 
perpetuity, 28, 29, 31, 35, 36, 37, 
39, 40, 43 
Plato, ii, 28, 29, 31, 34, 38, 49, 60, 
64, 65, 69, 135, 137, 139, 141, 
142, 146, 147, 148, 154 
Plotinus, 29, 30, 31, 32, 35, 36, 37, 
38, 43, 51, 64, 86 
Porphyry, 89 
Proclus, 29, 34, 39, 43, 59, 147, 
148 
ps.-Dionysius the Areopagite, 
37, 38, 43 
Q 
quality, 51, 60, 70 
quantity, 51, 60, 70, 148, 152 
quantum mechanics, 146, 147, 
169 
Index   179 
 
S 
Simplicius, 147, 148 
Single Monad Model, 145, 146, 
150, 151, 154, 157, 159, 160, 
168, 170, 172 
Socrates, 146, 147 
soul, 30, 31, 52, 55, 101, 162 
spatiotemporality, 60, 61 
substance, 59, 60, 70, 72, 77, 91, 
123, 155, 156, 157 
synthesis, ii, iii, 40, 42, 49, 58 
T 
temporality, i, 27, 28, 32, 36, 41, 
42, 47, 48, 49, 52, 59, 60, 63, 
64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 
72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 
108, 112, 119, 166, 172, 173 
transcendence, 79, 91, 168 
Z 
Zeno, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 
150, 151, 152, 153, 155, 157, 
167 
Α 
αἰών, i, 28, 33, 35, 36, 37, 39, 40, 
41, 42, 43, 44, 47, 49, 63, 65, 
66, 67, 68, 107 
Χ 
χρόνος, 49 
 
